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and garages’, and which is supposed to
express its attachment to the ‘founding
values of the Republic’ and, for instance,
support the ban of the Islamic scarf in
state schools and condemn ‘communi-
tarianism’. This distinction, used at all
levels of French public institutions, be-
comes a quasi-scientific category that is
employed by political leaders, exploited
in the media, and that structures main-
stream perceptions. It should be noted
that the ‘moderation’ of so-called ‘good’
Islam is not characterized in entirely the
same way in France and Great Britain.
Dominant discourses and perceptions
on questions regarding the place of reli-
gious or secular communities are not held in common. These opposi-
tions and differences in perceptions and founding myths (Republic vs.
Multiculturalism) do not however mean, as often thought by main-
stream analysis, that France and Great Britain embody contradictory
models on the matter of relations with the Muslim ‘other’. 
Significantly, ‘good’ Islam is portrayed to be authentic, the one and
only ‘true’ Islam. Simultaneously, ‘bad’ Islam is not only deemed ‘bad’ be-
cause it promotes social or political practices that are viewed as harmful,
but also because it is supposedly wrong at the theological level and
thereby opposed to the ‘true’ teachings of the Qur'an. Public institutions
have thus granted themselves the right to determine the authentic na-
ture of Islam. These public institutions do not escape the essentialist ap-
proach that considers this religion to exist independently of its followers’
divergent social practices. 
And while ‘good’ Islam is ‘integrated into the national community’,
‘bad’ Islam is seen as essentially foreign, imported through ‘transnation-
al networks’, connected with ‘international terrorism’ and thus not pos-
sibly ‘French’ or ‘British’. Nicolas Sarkozy, French Minister of the Interior,
once asserted, ‘We know that in the garages, in the caves of certain sub-
urbs, hateful and intolerant discourses are still being held in the name of
Islam. This Islam of disparity should not be [that of the Muslims of
France] since it does not have its place in France.’6 ‘Bad’ Muslims thus
represent an enemy from within that is directly connected to the inter-
national sphere, and to situations of conflict in the Muslim world. In De-
cember 2002, the French police arrested members of a so-called
‘Chechen network’, which was considered to be linked to just such inter-
national terrorism. This linkage, highlighted by the official discourse, is
meant to de-legitimize non-conforming Islam. Imams in particular, are
stigmatized and believed to be the main agents of the process of foreign
importation. As Sarkozy put it in an interview, ‘It is important that the Re-
public dialogues with Muslims. It is an issue of appeasement. What I
want is precisely an appeased and moderate Islam. I would add that this
mutual recognition also gives us more ability to fight the few imams that
transgress the law and preach violence and anti-Semitism. These should
be expelled.’7 Notably, Sarkozy refers only to ‘foreign’ imams, those who
can be expelled, as the only ones who preach violence.
Significantly, all the social practices that are considered negative by
dominant views are believed to be imported and are said to have noth-
ing to do with local political and social issues. In the framework of the
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCSA), voted into existence by
the British Parliament in November 2001, suspects are explicitly con-
The publication of Edward Said’s Orien-
talism in 1978 inspired a long series of
critical studies on the representation of
Islam and Muslims in ‘Western’ media
and politics. These studies, of varying
quality and interest, focused on the way
dominant discourses essentialize and
stigmatize Islam and the Muslim World.
It was to be expected that mainstream
reactions in North America and Europe
to the September 11th terrorist attacks
would constitute an elaboration on
those types of depictions. And indeed
many popular books, articles and edito-
rials published after 9/11 have insisted
on the allegedly intrinsic links between
terrorism and Islam. While true that Islamophobia is not new and that it
has been transmitted by various media, experts, and political parties and
organizations,1 it appears that, at least in Europe, 9/11 and its aftermath
have given rise to much more complex and ambiguous reactions than
were initially apparent.
For reasons having mainly to do with the proliferation of anti-discrimi-
nation norms and regulations, as well as the growing demographic
weight of Muslim citizens, the ministers, members of parliament, and
judges in France and Great Britain did not portray Islam or the Muslim
community as being responsible for the terrorist attacks of 9/11. A few
days after 9/11, Tony Blair stated that, ‘Blaming Islam is as ludicrous as
blaming Christianity for loyalist attacks on Catholics or nationalist attacks
on Protestants in Northern Ireland.’? Lionel Jospin, the then French Prime
Minister, similarly asserted that, ‘It must be clear that this fight against ter-
rorism is waged neither on Islam nor on Arab or Muslim countries.’? These
sorts of statements underscore a specific feature of post-9/11 reactions
from public institutions, most notably in both Great Britain and France,
which can be called the selective stigmatization of Islam and Muslims. 
As Mahmood Mamdani4 and Jocelyne Cesari5 observed, the 9/11 at-
tacks created conditions that required a distinction within dominant dis-
courses between what is considered ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam. Obviously,
this type of stigmatization is not new, and therefore 9/11 cannot be con-
sidered a total point of rupture with the past. The attempts to explain the
1979 Revolution in Iran and the actions of the Hizbollah in Lebanon, by at-
tributing these to the supposedly divergent nature of the Shi'a and Sunni
Muslims, already expressed a similar stigmatizing conception. Yet, with
the attacks in New York and Washington, this stigmatization has become
much more significant and has been quite systematically used by French
and British public bodies to legitimize certain government-adopted poli-
cies. 
Modalities of stigmatization 
The selective stigmatization of Islam and Muslims is based on certain,
usually implicit, characteristics that appear in the dominant social dis-
courses. First of all, so-called ‘good’ Islam (as opposed to ‘bad’ Islam) is
seen as moderate and must therefore explicitly and continuously con-
demn ‘political Islam’, stick to dominant views on international and
local issues and be vigorously opposed to all forms of terrorism.
The current conservative French government makes just such a dis-
tinction between ‘bad Islam’ and the preferred ‘openly visible Islam’ (‘l’Is-
lam au grand jour’), which is strictly opposed to the ‘Islam of the caves
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Current Issues
Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September
2001 Islam has become increasingly
associated with intolerance and violence in
public debates in Europe. However, in the
aftermath of 9/11 ‘good’ images of Islam have
also been highlighted in opposition to ‘bad’
I s l a m . Governments and political parties in
various European countries, including France
and the UK, along with the stigmatization and
criminalization of ‘bad’ Islam, have
contributed to the elaboration of this more
‘positive’ imagery. The differences between
French and British approaches in this process
of 'othering' towards Islam are much less real





nected to the outside; thus some sections of this act that concern the de-
portation and detention of so-called ‘suspected international terrorists’
(Sections 22 and 23) and exclude any protection under the refugee con-
vention (Sections 33 and 34), apply to foreigners only. The case of Abu
Hamza al-Misri, former preacher of the Finsbury Park mosque, reveals
the resolve to externalize the so-called ‘bad’ Muslim. Those, like Labour
MP Andrew Dismore who support the act, directly applied section 4 of
the new Asylum, Immigration and Nationality Act that came into force in
April 2003 to Abu Hamza. This act enables the state to revoke the British
citizenship of immigrants who are considered to ‘seriously prejudice the
United Kingdom’s interests.’ The revoking of Abu Hamza’s British nation-
ality and, as a result, his possible deportation, permitted the government
to stress even more his supposed foreignness. 
Materializing the distinction
Ever since 9/11 governments in both Britain and France have shown
themselves to be keen on ‘integrating’ those considered ‘good’ Muslims;
that is, to institutionalize the relations with the so-called ‘good’ faction of
Islam. The 9/11 events were conveniently used as an opportunity to in-
tensify the relations between the British Labour government and certain
Muslim organizations, particularly the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). In
France, the victory of the conservative government in June 2002 lead to
an acceleration of the process of the formation of the Conseil Français du
Culte Musulman (CFCM).8 The creation of this top-down structured
council, basically controlled by the Ministry of the Interior and first initi-
ated (under a different name, and with different methods and organiza-
tions) in the beginning of the 1990s, is believed to be an answer to 9/11. 
In France, the new debates on laïcité, and the specific law that could be
adopted to ban the Islamic scarf from state schools, have surfaced as the
direct responses of different groups to the recognition of ‘good’ Islam as
promoted by the CFCM and the levels of government involved in its cre-
ation. David Blunkett, Home Office Secretary and author of the National-
ity, Immigration and Asylum Bill, passed in 2002, underscores the grow-
ing need for a critical revaluation of the concept of multiculturalism and
the assertion of specific values concerning the ‘integration’ of ‘immi-
grants’. The institutional determination to include or, to use the more
common vocabulary of the Republic, to ’integrate’ the ‘good’ Islamic fac-
tion, goes together with the exclusion of what is considered to be the
‘bad’ one. The struggle against terror and the numerous negaative ef-
fects of this on the livelihoods of Muslims, are legitimized by the process-
es of inclusion regarding ‘good’ Islam, in the form of the CFCM or the
MCB or otherwise, in mainstream discourses. 
Contrary to Great Britain, France did not formally adopt a state of ex-
ception after 9/11, yet the Labour government did add temporary
amendments granting police special powers to the ‘Law on Everyday
Security’, which were unconstitutionally imple-
mented by Parliament in November 2001. The re-
enforcement of the ‘Plan Vigipirate’ (applied in in-
stances of high terrorist threat) took place imme-
diately after 9/11. Its stipulations also grant tem-
porary powers to the police and judiciary in order
to wage war against terrorists. The articles in the
‘Law on Everyday Security’ connected to the new
‘global threat’, amongst many other things, facili-
tate deportations from French territory and allow
for pre-emptive action against suspected terror-
i s t s .9 The Ministry of the Interior is now able to
justify the arrests of Muslim individuals by simply
stating, ‘The coming days will allow us to see if
they are involved in serious affairs.’1 0
The selective perceptions and portrayals of
Islam and Muslims, and the ambiguous language
and messages that underlie the practices of pub-
lic bodies today, are important and possibly last-
ing characteristics of the relations between the
body politic and Muslims in the post-9/11 context
in France and Britain, and possibly in other Euro-
pean countries as well. The differences between
French and British approaches towards Islam are
much less real than they are often believed to be.
Post-9/11 has brought with it a consensus on the
nature of what constitutes the ‘other’, thus blur-
ring the French republican and the British multi-
cultural models.
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